The Canadian Philosophical Association: Annual Congress 2018, Université du Québec à Montréal, June 4-7, 2018
I will be presenting my paper 'Relativized Fundamentality', and giving comments on Damian Melamedoff's paper 'Truthmaker Noumenalism'.
I'll be presenting my paper 'Metaphysical Explanation in Spinoza and Leibniz', which explores the relationship between 'sufficient reason' and 'metaphysical explanation'.
I will be presenting my paper 'Ignorance Lost: How We Cognize Things in Themselves', with comments from Karl Schafer. I argue for a novel interpretation of Kant's 'humility thesis', the thesis that we have no cognition of things in themselves.
As part of the NYC Minorities and Philosophy Spring Workshop Series, I will be giving a talk on the question of how the patriarchal structures present in Islam can be reconciled with a feminist outlook. A draft of the paper is available upon request.
I'll be giving my paper 'Relativized Fundamentality', in which I argue against an absolutist conception of fundamentality---a conception on which a fact cannot be both fundamental and not fundamental in the same world at the same time---and for a relativized conception, on which whether a fact counts as fundamental is determined relative to a metaphysical dependence relation. I thereby show that a proponent of the PSR can be committed to fundamental facts without sacrificing the irreflexivity or asymmetry of explanation. Click here for a full program.
I am organizing a conference that aims to bring together historical and contemporary perspectives on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The conference will take place at Simon Fraser University in Spring 2018. A lineup and more details can be found here.
I'll be discussing my paper 'Kant's Humility Thesis and Grounded Appearances' at the 1st International Summer School in Mainz, directed by Professor Eric Watkins.
I'll be presenting my paper 'Grounding Perspectival Facts' at the Pacific APA, with comments by Kelly Trogdon.
I'll also be giving a set of comments on Rebecca Chan's paper at the Themes in Transformative Experience pre-conference.
I'll be discussing my paper 'The Ontological Status of Identity', which argues that we should do away with an ontological commitment to the identity relation.
I'll be presenting my paper 'How a Necessary Fact Can Ground a Contingent Fact' at the Oxford Graduate Conference, with comments from Ofra Magidor. More details here.