Rest cursor on the word 'Abstract' to see an abstract.
Articles and Book Chapters
(forthcoming) 'The Contingency of Creation and Divine Choice' Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion [Abstract]
(forthcoming) 'Russell on Propositions'(with Dominic Alford-Duguid) The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Eds. C. Tillman and A. Murray
(forthcoming) 'Russell's Commitment to the Principle of Acquaintance' Oxford Handbook of Bertrand Russell. Ed. K. Klement[Abstract]
(forthcoming) 'Brute Facts: What are they? What do we want them to be?', Principle of Sufficient Reason. Eds. F. Amijee and M. Della Rocca, Oxford University Press
(forthcoming) 'Metaphysics', Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Ed. M. Rossberg
(2021) 'Explaining Contingent Facts' Philosophical Studies 178(4): 1163-1181. [Abstract]
(2021) ‘Something from Nothing: Why Some Negative Existentials are Fundamental’ Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence. Eds. S. Bernstein and T. Goldschmidt, Oxford University Press [Abstract]
(2020) 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. Ed. M. Raven[Abstract]
(2013) 'The Role of Attention in Russell's Theory of Knowledge' British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6): 1175-1193.
(forthcoming) 'Russell on Propositions'(with Dominic Alford-Duguid) The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Eds. C. Tillman and A. Murray
(forthcoming) 'Russell's Commitment to the Principle of Acquaintance' Oxford Handbook of Bertrand Russell. Ed. K. Klement[Abstract]
(forthcoming) 'Brute Facts: What are they? What do we want them to be?', Principle of Sufficient Reason. Eds. F. Amijee and M. Della Rocca, Oxford University Press
(forthcoming) 'Metaphysics', Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Ed. M. Rossberg
(2021) 'Explaining Contingent Facts' Philosophical Studies 178(4): 1163-1181. [Abstract]
(2021) ‘Something from Nothing: Why Some Negative Existentials are Fundamental’ Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence. Eds. S. Bernstein and T. Goldschmidt, Oxford University Press [Abstract]
(2020) 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. Ed. M. Raven[Abstract]
(2013) 'The Role of Attention in Russell's Theory of Knowledge' British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6): 1175-1193.
Encyclopedia Entries
(2021) ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’, Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences (Eds. Dana Jalobeanu and Charles T. Wolfe).
Work in Progress and Under Review
Titles have been replaced by descriptions in order to preserve blind review. Email me for drafts.
Feminist ideology can be reconciled with Islam. [Abstract; Draft Available]
We ought to be commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. [Abstract; Draft Available]
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not threatened by quantum mechanics. [Abstract; Draft Available]
Fundamentality is relative to a mode of explanation. [Abstract; Draft Available]
We should not be ontologically committed to identity. [Abstract; Draft Available]
How we can reconcile Kant's humility thesis with his claims about things-in-themselves [Abstract; Draft Available]
Contingent facts are explained plurally in Leibniz. [Abstract; Draft Available]
The norms governing epistemic justice are paradoxical. [Abstract; Draft in Progress]
Belief is subject to a nonsense norm. [Abstract; Draft Available]
Du Châtelet and Leibniz on Substance and Causation [Abstract; Draft in Progress]
Du Châtelet’s Argument for a Commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Abstract; Draft in Progress]
We ought to be commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. [Abstract; Draft Available]
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not threatened by quantum mechanics. [Abstract; Draft Available]
Fundamentality is relative to a mode of explanation. [Abstract; Draft Available]
We should not be ontologically committed to identity. [Abstract; Draft Available]
How we can reconcile Kant's humility thesis with his claims about things-in-themselves [Abstract; Draft Available]
Contingent facts are explained plurally in Leibniz. [Abstract; Draft Available]
The norms governing epistemic justice are paradoxical. [Abstract; Draft in Progress]
Belief is subject to a nonsense norm. [Abstract; Draft Available]
Du Châtelet and Leibniz on Substance and Causation [Abstract; Draft in Progress]
Du Châtelet’s Argument for a Commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Abstract; Draft in Progress]
